Exploitation risk: The barrier to weaponizing this technique is lower than Microsoft’s security messaging would suggest, Hagenah said.”They only need code running in the user’s context and a way to reuse the authorized Recall session,” he said. “That is a much lower bar than many people would assume from Microsoft’s security messaging.”While Recall’s limitation to Copilot+ PCs and its opt-in status reduce the scale of exposure, targeted abuse is a realistic near-term risk, he said. “For targeted abuse, surveillance, or high-value user collection, this is absolutely realistic,” he said.Hagenah said he published the source code deliberately so defenders, EDR vendors, and security teams could build detections before threat actors operationalize the technique independently. “In my view, that gives the defensive side a valuable head start,” he said.Independent security researcher Kevin Beaumont reached a similar conclusion after separately testing the current Recall implementation. “Yep, you can just read the database as a user process,” Beaumont wrote on Mastodon on March 11. “The database also contains all manner of fields that aren’t publicly disclosed for tracking the user’s activity. No AV or EDR alerts triggered,” he wrote.Microsoft did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
First seen on csoonline.com
Jump to article: www.csoonline.com/article/4159643/microsofts-windows-recall-still-allows-silent-data-extraction.html
